This paper derives optimal commodity taxes in a two-class economy based on k-equitability. An allocation is k-equitable if no agent envies a proportion k of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations in a class of k-equitable allocations. We first show that the consistency between envy reduction and enhancement of the low-skilled agent's utility depends on 1) the income elasticity of leisure 2) the degree of preference and skill differences. On the optimal tax rule, we can show the following. When the envy constraint is binding, ceteris paribus, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and of high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily. The optimal commodity tax is uniform if, in addition to weak separability, sub-utility of the goods is homothetic.
Introduction
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When sophisticated tax-transfer policies based on one's ability are infeasible, there arises a hierarchy of envy: for any allocation implementable by income and commodity taxation, the high skilled agent never envies the low skilled agent, whereas, when preferences are identical, the low skilled always envies the high skilled, except for some trivial allocations (Bo¨s and Tillmann 1985) . The celebrated equity concept of no-envy faces difficulty in this situation, and some cardinal measure to evaluate the intensity of envy is required when the government's objective is the reduction of envy.
Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990) considered the following measure of envy. An allocation is k-equitable if no agent envies a proportion k of the bundle of any other agent. The value of k measures the intensity of envy. If k is unity, it is the usual no-envy case. Any feasible allocation satisfies zero-equitability. They propose to choose the Pareto efficient allocations which maximize k (hereafter referred to as the Diamantaras-Thomson allocations). This paper, more broadly, studies the maximal welfare combinations if the government is constrained by a given k-equitability requirement, referred to as the k-constrained second-best frontier. Varying k, we can depict the set of the second-best welfare frontiers with various envy constraints. This constrained frontier explicitly considers the conflict between Paretian welfare and the reduction of envy, and extends Tadenuma's (2002) equity-first principle. This paper studies how given k-equitability requirements affect the qualitative properties of tax implementable allocations, by looking at the efficient allocations among the k-equitable allocations.
We consider a two-class economy, commonly used in the theory of optimal taxation, in which there are agents with high and low skill levels. First, we examine how the second-best utility possibility frontier contracts with the additional requirement of k-equitability. A natural prediction is that, the more favorable is the allocation to the low skilled agent, the less is the amount of envy. In environments where this conjecture holds, the contraction of the utility possibility frontier occurs in the area which is favorable to the high skilled agent; some of these allocations are judged inequitable. When preferences are identical, this conjecture is true in a wide class of economies (Proposition 1). However, this result does not always hold true. When the income elasticity of leisure is less than unity, the Diamantaras-Thomson allocation may differ from the Rawlsian solution (Proposition 2). Moreover, when preferences are heterogeneous, there exists an economy in which the Diamantaras-Thomson allocation is the Pareto efficient point which minimizes the welfare of the low skilled agent (Proposition 3). Numerical examples suggest that the conflict between reducing envy and enhancing the low skilled agents' welfare occurs when preferences are sufficiently diverse and/or skill differences are sufficiently close.
We then characterize the tax rules along the k-constrained second-best frontier. The tax formula in terms of the conventional index of discouragement (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971; Mirrlees 1975 Mirrlees , 1976 ) is shown in Proposition 4. There are two cases to examine: those in which the envy constraint does not bind, where the classical optimal commodity tax rules
